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Bradly S. Torgan
Nearly twenty years ago Justice Brennan penned the line "if a policeman
must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?"' Most planners have at
least a passing notion of takings law and the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which prevents the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation.^ Constitutional limitations on zoning, though,
can go far beyond the Fifth Amendment.
Over the past several years two Constitutional doctrines which might
seem esoteric to most non-attorneys, have been used with varying degrees of
success in challenging zoning ordinances which discriminate against manu-
factured housing, preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause. The pur-
pose of this article is twofold: first, to explain the two doctrines and review
recent federal court cases from the last three years in which they were raised
and second, to briefly divine ft'om those cases some practical advice for
planners and other local government decision makers.
Constitutional Doctrines Related To Manufactured
Housing Zoning Challenges
Preemption
Preemption is a federal doctrine that invalidates state and local laws that
conflict or interfere vvdth federal laws. The doctrine flows from the Suprem-
acy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution, which states:
This constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof. ..shall be
the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby. . .^
Under the doctrine, preemption of state statutes or local ordinances oc-
curs in one of three manners: (1) Congress may pass a statute which ex-
pressly preempts state or local law, (2) Congress, while not expressly pre-
empting state or local law, implies that it is preempting the field by occupy-
ing the entire field of regulation so that there is no room for supplementary
regulation at the state or local level, or (3) Congress neither expressly nor
impliedly preempts state or local law, but state or local law neverthe less
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conflicts with federal law in that compliance with
both federal and state or local law would be im-
possible or when state or local law stands as an
objective to the purpose of the federal law.*
Manufactured housing construction and safety
standards are explicitly preempted by the National
Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety
Standards Act of 1974 ("the Act"):
Whenever a Federal manufactured
home construction and safety standard
established under this chapter is in ef-
fect, no State or political subdivision of
a State shall have any authority either
to establish, or to continue in effect,
with respect to any manufactured home
covered, any standard regarding the
construction or safety applicable to the
same aspect of performance of such
manufactured home which is not iden-
tical to the Federal manufactured home
construction and safety standard. ^
That is, a state or local government cannot
have a building code for manufactured homes,
which differs from the Federal code which im-
plements the Act.* While zoning decisions are
traditionally the province of state and local gov-
ernments, zoning decisions regarding manufac-
tured housing can, and have, run afoul of the pre-
emption doctrine when those decisions are based
on construction codes and the perception of
safety.
Homes built in a factory to the Federal Code
and transported to a home site are usually referred
to as "HUD Code manufactured homes" because
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment is responsible for promulgation and
administration of the code.^ Factory-built homes
constructed to a local construction code such as
the Uniform Building Code, on the other hand, are
referred to as "modular homes."
Commerce Clause
Zoning decisions regarding manufactured
housing can also run afoul of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. Under
the Commerce Clause, "Congress shall have the
Power... to regulate commerce among the several
states."^ This grant to Congress implies a related
restriction preventing state and local governments
fi-om adopting certain laws that have an economi-
cally protectionist intent or effect, essentially iso-
lating a local economy from the national econ-
omy. This is often referred to as the "dormant
Commerce Clause."'
There are two tests used to determine whether
a local ordinance violates the dormant Commerce
Clause. First, if a statute ordinance discriminates
against interstate commerce on its face or its ef-
fects favor in-state interests at the expense of out-
of-state interests, the law will be found to violate
the dormant Commerce Clause unless the dis-
crimination is demonstrably justified by a valid
factor unrelated to economic protectionism.'" On
the other hand, if the statute or ordinance operates
even-handedly, is based on a legitimate govern-
mental interest and has an "incidental impact" on
interstate commerce, the regulation "will be up-
held unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive to the putative local
benefit."" This balancing test is usually referred
to as the
"
Pike test," so named for the Supreme
Court case in which the test was first enunciated.
How might a local zoning ordinance regard-
ing manufactured housing run afoul of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause? The theory is actually
quite simple. Manufactured homes are items of
interstate commerce. They may be constructed
out-of-state, or simply contain components, like
fixtures or lumber, constructed or processed out-
of-state. A zoning ordinance which restricts
placement of a manufactured home, by implica-
tion a home built to a national building code, im-
pedes the flow of interstate commerce in favor of
local economic interests and locally site-built
homes constructed to a local building code.
Courts have declined to apply the more re-
strictive economic protectionism Commerce
Clause test to manufactured housing zoning dis-
putes, but even imder the Pike test plaintiffs have
not fared all that well using the doctrine to chal-
lenge discriminatory manufactured housing ordi-
nances. Nevertheless, the courts have spelled out
some of what might be necessary for a challenge
to succeed, a road map to which planners and
other local government decision makers should
pay heed.
Recent Court Cases
Over the past three years, federal courts from
Colorado to Georgia have been confronted with
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preemption and dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to local manufactured housing zoning
regulations, with divergent results, especially on
the issue of preemption. The United States Su-
preme Court has made no pronouncements on the
issue, so how a community may be affected de-
pends on the area of the country in which the
community is located. Viewing all the cases in
context, however, including lower court decisions
that may have been reversed on appeal, can pro-
vide planners and local government officials with
guidelines that are sound from both a constitu-
tional and planning perspective, guidelines which
may help as they wrestle with the often thorny
policy considerations that surround manufactured
housing and zoning.
Not surprisingly, most of the cases come from
the Southeastern United States, where the major-
ity of manufactured homes are both constructed
and sold.'" Of most interest to North Carolina
planners is the 1998 case from the U.S. District
Court for the Western District, CMH Manufac-
turing. Inc. V. Catawba County Board of Commis-
sioners ("Catawba County"), decided in February
1998.''
The case was a challenge to specific restric-
tions on exterior fmish and roof pitch in the
Catawba County zoning ordinance applicable to
single section manufactured homes that otherwise
met the HUD Code. The practical effect of the
restrictions was to eliminate "metal on metal" sin-
gle section homes from the County. Specifically,
the restrictions challenged were as follows:
Exterior Finish. The exterior siding
shall consist predominantly of vinyl or
aluminum lap siding (whose reflectiv-
ity does not exceed that of flat white
paint), wood or hardboard comparable
in composition, appearance and dura-
bility to the exterior siding commonly
used in standard residential construc-
tion.
Roof construction. The roof shall be
designed to have a minimum rise of 2
V2 feet for each 12 feet of horizontal
run and finished with a type of shingle
that is commonly used in standard resi-
dential construction.'"
The basic analysis the court used in deter-
mining whether preemption applied was whether
the restrictions were construction standards pre-
empted by the Act or appearance standards ex-
pressly permitted by the North Carolina General
Statutes.'^ The court held they were appearance
standards allowed by North Carolina law. In
making this determination, the court looked to
legislative intent of the Act and concluded that
Act and the federal regulation adopted thereunder
were "directed at safety, and are not concerned
with regulation of the appearance or aesthetic
characteristics of manufactured housing."'*
Safety-related construction standards, the court
implied, dealt with housing systems explicitly
mentioned in the regulations implementing the
Act, items such as the plumbing, heating, and
electrical systems.'^ The implementing regula-
tions, by contract, indicated no preference, in
terms of safety for a particular siding or roofing
material.'* The court did recognize that regulating
location of manufactured homes for aesthetic rea-
sons made under the guise of safety could be pre-
empted. What would evidence this, though, would
be restrictions based on specific building codes,
"which by their very nature address safety con-
cerns," as a prerequisite for siting.
"
Catawba County also provided justification
unrelated to safety, indicating it had:
enacted the amendments to its zoning
ordinance as part of a comprehensive
plan to balance the interests of citizens
who oppose mobile home proliferation
with those of the manufactured housing
industry and its customer base. The
amendments establish appearance crite-
ria... for single-wide mobile homes in
order to make them appear more at-
tractive, less likely to drive down
nearby property values, and generally
more palatable to the objecting pub-
lic.^°
This last justification, however, may rest on
grounds shaky for other jurisdictions which try to
use it. Even though courts generally accept the
rationale, as did the court here, the County pro-
vided no statistical or empirical evidence that the
criteria would protect property values or that
"metal-on-metal" homes devalued neighboring
property or drained the County's tax base,'^' an
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approach that could fail if empirical data to the
contrary is introduced. Moreover, while the
County claimed that the criteria were a compro-
mise to citizen pressure to ban manufactured
homes altogether from large swaths to the County,
the County Commissioners continued to adopt
such bans after the court issued its opinion.
Within weeks of the court's opinion, the Board of
County Commissioners voted to ban all manu-
factured homes from 2,600 acres along the N.C.
Highway 16 corridor near the Anderson Mountain
area of the county, and banned single-section
homes from another 23 1 acres.^^ A similarly situ-
ated jurisdiction could leave itself open to charges
that the otherwise legitimate zoning decision was
a pretext for an improper decision based on con-
struction standards.
A challenge based on the dormant Commerce
Clause fared no better. Using the Pike test, which
both sides agreed governed the dispute, the court
first found legitimate local purposes for adopting
the criteria. These included the divisiveness of the
issue in Catawba County, and the desire to bal-
ance opportunities for affordable home ownership
with concerns for aesthetic standards and de-
creasing property values.^ By contrast the plain-
tiffs could only point to evidence that manufactur-
ers who had previously sold metal-on-metal
homes in the County no longer could. No concrete
evidence of lost sales or lost profit was shown,
nor was there evidence that a certain segment of
the market would be shut out from all new home
opportunities. In fact, the court found that, be-
cause manufactured homes are generally sold pur-
suant to installment sales contracts or other long
term financing arrangements, the cost to consum-
ers of complying with the criteria could be built
into the financing with only a de minimus impact
on a purchaser's monthly payment.'^* Under the
Pike test; the burden placed on the manufactured
home industry and its consumer base was not ex-
cessive to the declared local benefit.^^
The federal Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals^^ reached a similar conclusion in one of the
most recent cases decided, Georgia Manufactured
Housing Assn. v. Spalding County r'Spalding
County"). ^^ In reaching its conclusion, though, it
had to reverse the decision of the district court.
At issue in Spalding County was a zoning or-
dinance that placed manufactured homes into
certain categories based on ostensibly appearance-
related criteria. What the ordinance defined as a
"Class A" manufactured home had not only to
meet the HUD Code, but had to meet other criteria
including a width of greater than 16 feet, a roof
pitch of 4:12 or greater (four feet of rise for
twelve feet of horizontal run), roofing shingles
similar to those of site-built residential construc-
tion, exterior siding similar to that of site-built
residential construction and a masonry curtain
wall around the base of the home. "Class B"
manufactured homes also had to meet the HUD
Code, but none of the other additional criteria.
Class A homes were allowed by right in residen-
tial zoning districts, but Class B homes were al-
lowed only as exceptions.^*
The state trade association for the manufac-
tured housing industry, along with individual
manufacturers, retailers and county residents who
had been denied permits brought suit against the
County, attempting to invalidate the ordinance on
a number of grounds, including both preemption
and the dormant commerce clause. The District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, agreed
that the 4:12 roof pitch requirements was both
preempted by the Act and violated the dormant
commerce clause.^'
That lower court held that the roof pitch re-
quirement conflicted with one of the stated pur-
poses of the Act, "to improve the quality and du-
rability of manufactured homes, " and was thus
preempted. The evidence before the court showed
that 4:12 roofs were inferior in both quality and
durability to roofs with a lower pitch because 4:12
roofs had to be built with a hinge system in order
to be fransported on state highways. The 4:12 roof
pitch requirement also substantially impeded
manufacturers' ability to comply with other safety
regulations in the HUD Code, including factory
installation of the venting and combustion air
systems and "wind load" requirements.^"
The district court also held against the County
on dormant commerce clause grounds. Using the
Pike balancing test, the court noted that the roof
pitch requirement caused significant problems to
manufacturers, both inside and outside Georgia,
with the potential to significantly increase costs to
both members of the industry, as well as the pur-
chasing public. By contrast, according to the court
the aesthetic value and value of compatibility with
site-built structures which underpinned a 4:12
roof pitch requirement was "minimal, at best."^'
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The Court of Appeals rejected both of these
arguments. As to preemption, the court reviewed
the Act, its legislative intent and implementing
regulations to conclude that the safety standards
preempted by the Act are those which protect
consumers from potential hazards associated with
manufactured housing. A roof pitch requirement
in a zoning ordinance is an aesthetic standard
having no basis in consumer protection, and thus
not preempted.^^
As to the Commerce Clause, the Court of Ap-
peals held the lower court used the wrong findings
for the Pike tests. The lower court focused on the
burden on commerce generally, rather than a spe-
cific burden on interstate commerce. It is that spe-
cific burden, though, that forms the basis for any
violation of the Commerce Clause.^^ The roof
pitch requirement creates significant problems in
the manufacturing process for both in and out-of-
state manufacturers, but the requirement imposes
the same burden on all manufacturers, regardless
of location. Laws that impose the same burden on
both in and out-of-state manufacturers usually do
not violate the Commerce Clause. Moreover, the
court held, price increases, in and of themselves,
generally do not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. Effect on price goes to the legislative wis-
dom of the ordinance, not the burden on interstate
commerce.^''
The court pointed to two areas of evidence
that could show the specific burden on interstate
commerce: that which shows whatever housing is
built in lieu of HUD-Code manufactured homes is
provided by in-state suppliers, and that which
shows that a 4:12 roof pitch requirement will sig-
nificantly benefit the local site-built home market
at the expense of the manufactured home mar-
ket.-'^ The plaintiffs in Spalding County failed to
provide that kind of evidence to the court leading
the court to find that the burden on interstate
commerce, based on relevant evidence, weighed
in favor of the county.^^
The 1998 decisions in Catawba County and
Spalding County followed three decisions in 1996
from federal courts in Colorado and the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. The district court in Colo-
rado and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals split
on the issue of preemption, although both ruled
against manufactured housing interests on the
dormant commerce clause issue.
In Colorado Manufactured Housing Associa-
tion V. Board of County Commissioners of the
County of Pueblo. ^^ the district court held that
zoning ordinances which distinguished between
HUD Code manufactured homes and modular
homes and prohibited HUD Code manufactured
homes in the jurisdiction while permitting modu-
lar homes was preempted by the Act. In chal-
lenging the plaintiffs' preemption claims, the de-
fendant Cities maintained that their respective
ordinances dealt only with land use and not with
the manner in which the homes were constructed.
Further, they claimed preemption wasn't applica-
ble because the purpose of the ordinances was to
regulate community appearance and protect the
tax base, not to impose safety and construction
standards on manufactured homes different from
the federal standards.^^ The court rejected the cit-
ies' claims. All zoning ordinances have the pur-
pose of regulating land use, the court said. Under
the cities' reasoning, an ordinance could impose
strict building and safety standards for manufac-
tured housing that clearly conflict with the HUD
Code, but preemption would clearly be inapplica-
ble because the overall "purpose" of the ordinance
was regulating land use. This reasoning is incor-
rect. "Under the preemption doctnne, if the local
and federal law conflict, the local law is invalid
and must be set aside... Either there is a conflict
requiring preemption, or no conflict and, thus, no
preemption."^^ Ordinances which require a fac-
tory-built home to comply with a building code
other than the HUD Code are in conflict with the
HUD Code, resulting in preemption.
The Court, in County of Pueblo, did not ad-
dress the issue of whether an ordinance that
banned all factory-built homes, regardless of
whether they were manufactured to the HUD
Code or a local building code, from a zoning dis-
trict was preempted. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit,'"' though, did reach that issue and
found no preemption in Texas Manufactured
Housing Association v. City of Nederland ("City
of Nederland"),"' decided only several months
after County of Pueblo .
In City of Nederland , the challenged ordi-
nance prohibited the placement of "trailer
coaches" within the City limits, defming a trailer
coach as "a transportable single family dwelling
unit which is or may be mounted on wheels suit-
able for year-round occupancy and containing the
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same water supply, waste disposal, and electrical
conveniences as immobile housing.'"*^ The City
had interpreted the ordinance to preclude HUD-
Code manufactured homes, but not modular
homes. The decision noted that unlike manufac-
tured housing, modular housing is not built on a
permanent chassis,''^ although in reality modular
homes can be built on a chassis and transported in
a manner similar to HUD Code manufactured
homes.
The court upheld the ordinance, although the
decision appears to conflict directly with an ear-
lier manufactured home zoning preemption case,
Scurlock V. City of Lynn Haven ("Scurlock").
decided by the Eleventh Circuit in IPSS."^ In
Scurlock, on which the plaintiffs in Citv of
Nederland relied, the City excluded factory built
homes from certain residential districts imless
they met local building codes, in essence banning
HUD Code manufactured homes while permitting
modular homes. The Citv of Nederland court dis-
tinguished Scurlock. though, because the Neder-
land ordinance, among other things, did not ex-
pressly link its provisions to local safety and con-
struction standards.*^ That is, the ordinance did
not on its face, distinguish between HUD Code
manufactured homes and modular homes. This
difference between the Nederland's ordinances
and that at issue in Scurlock led the Fifth Circuit
to the conclusion that what was required to show
preemption was evidence and an analysis of the
specific differences between the HUD Code and
whatever local building code was in use."* In fact,
much of the evidence at trial in Scurlock dealt
with specific differences between the HUD Code
and the Southern Standards Building Code and
electrical codes with which compliance was re-
quired before the city would permit a factory-built
home to be located within the particular zoning
district."' The plaintiffs in Citv of Nederland pro-
vided no such evidence or analysis.
Plaintiffs have not cited evidence that
identifies the actual requirements of the
local building code that HUD-code
homes fail to satisfy under the ordi-
nance This omission is fatal to plain-
tiffs claim that the ordinance is a
thinly veiled attempt to impose local
safety and construction standards on
HUD-code manufactured homes. The
relevant deposition testimony, taken as
a whole, does not distinguish between
local safety and construction standards
and all other aspects of local building
regulation (including the ordinance at
issue in this case.)"*
The court, in Citv of Nederland. also dis-
missed the Commerce Clause claims. The burden
on interstate commerce claimed was $900,000 in
lost sales over a three-year period, but this was
not the type of evidence sufficient to show a bur-
den for Commerce Clause purposes. The City's
ordinance treated in-state producers of manufac-
tured homes equally to out-of-state firms. The
Commerce Clause, through, protects interstate
markets, not particular interstate firms. For evi-
dence of lost manufactured housing sales to be
relevant, the plaintiffs would have to show that
the housing built in-lieu of HUD Code was and
will be provided by in-state producers. In short,
not only did plaintiffs have to show $900,000 in
lost sales, but that any homes sales which replaced
those lost to HUD Code manufactured homes
would be provided by in-state producers. The
plaintiffs did not provide this evidence."'
The benefit given by the City was protection
of property values and at least one appraisal pro-
vided by the City stated that the presence ofHUD
Code manufactured homes in a residential neigh-
borhood of conventional site-built homes had a
negative impact on property values. The plaintiffs
claimed that "numerous studies" concluded that
property values are not diminished by the pres-
ence of adjacent HUD Code manufactured homes,
but did not provide these studies to the court. This
left the court with no alternative but to find in fa-
vor of the City and uphold the lower court's ruling
that there was no genuine issue as to whether any
burden the ordinance may impose on interstate
commerce is clearly excessive to the local bene-
fits...'""
The Court, in County of Pueblo, left the
Commerce Clause issue for trial, but the eventual
outcome, decided after Citv of Nederland . was
identical.^' In fact, the district court rehed heavily
on the Citv of Nederland analysis in eventually
rejecting the Commerce Clause challenge.'^
24 CAROLINA PLANNING • WINTER 1999
MANUFACTURED HOUSING ZONING
Guidelines for Planners and
other Decision Makers
What does the sum total of these recent cases
mean for manufactured home zoning? On the
whole, the cases appear to conflict on the issue of
preemption, and manufactured home proponents
have been frustrated in their attempts to attack
discriminatory ordinances on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds. Nevertheless, even though use of
the two doctrines have lost some of their luster,
especially challenges based on the Commerce
Clause, they retain some vitality and these recent
cases provide some broad direction for planners
and other decision makers.
An ordinance which explicitly distinguishes
between HUD Code manufactured homes and
homes built to the local building code, whether
factory-built or site-built, are suspect if HUD
Code manufactured homes are prohibited entirely
from a particular jurisdiction or zoning district,
Citv of Nederland notwithstanding." Not only is
the construction code the only inherent difference
between HUD Code manufactured homes and any
home built to a local building code, but attempting
to ban modular homes puts a jurisdiction in the
unenviable position of having to defend distin-
guishing between a site-built home and a factory-
built home constructed to the same code. A zon-
ing ordinance which distinguishes between HUD
Code manufactured homes and homes built to
local building codes based on anything other than
exterior appearance, such as plumbing hook-ups,
will also be suspect.
Appearance based regulations are more likely
to pass muster if there is a legitimate and ex-
pressed policy rationale to form a basis for the
restriction, preferably expressed prior to adopting
the restrictions. A part of what saved the ordi-
nance in Spalding County was the existence of
language in its comprehensive plan dealing with
aesthetic incompatibility. While the Spalding
County comprehensive plan wasn't adopted until
several months after the ordinance, that approach
could leave a jurisdiction open to charges that
concerns over aesthetic compatibility or property
values are simply a pretext for regulation based on
construction standards.
As cases like Catawba County and Spalding
County imply, statistical or empirical data is not
generally necessary for a local jurisdiction to jus-
tify legislative decisions like zoning. Such evi-
dence might go to the wisdom of the legislation,
but not the legality. When faced with data show-
ing no impact ofHUD Code manufactured homes
on adjacent residential property values, though,
the lack of any empirical data to support zoning
which discriminates
against HUD Code manu- feW
factured homes leaves j •
local governments vulner- l6glSLClllV6
able to charges that the decisionS OVer
challenged ordinance is
-^ +• 1
simply a pretext for reSiaential
regulation based on ZOniUQ
construction standards, j
and has no relationship engender
to actually protecting debate CIS
property values While
^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^
no empincal data seems
to have been introduced OVeV
m these recent cases, fnanufaCtUVed
academic studies
_
indicating little or no im- nOUSing,
pact of HUD Code tOUcMng On
manufactured housing
issues asare to
complex as
beginning
emerge.^''
Few legislative , j
decisions over residential CiaSS ana
zoning engender debate community
as heated as that over ,
manufactured housing, ^CllUeS.
touching on issues as complex as class and com-
munity values. City councilpersons and county
commissioners faced with heated debate over
their legislative decision are too often confronted
by threats of legal action. Legal theories used to
limit legislative discrimination against HUD Code
manufactured homes, though, cannot be discarded
as the knee-jerk reactions of those on the losing
side of the zoning decision. The two constitutional
limitations addressed here, preemption and the
dormant Commerce Clause, have some vitality,
albeit a vitality limited in effectiveness over the
past few years. Local ordinances should address
the issues these doctrines raise as a way of keep-
ing the legislative decision making out of the
hands of the courts. ^^
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Colorado Manufactured Housing Association v.
Board of County Commissioners of the Coimtv of
Pueblo. 946 F.Supp. 1539 (D.Colo. 1996).
Id. at 1548.
38
39
40
Id. at 1551, n.9.
The Fifth Circuit covers the states of Texas, Lou-
isiana and Mississippi. 28 U.S.C. §41.
Texas Manufactured Housing Association v. City
ofNederiand
. 101 F.3d 1095 (5* Cir. 1996).
"^
Id. at 1098.
'^^
Id. at 1099.
'^ Scurlock V. City of Lynn Haven. 858 F.2d 1521
(11* Cir. 1988).
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45
47
48
City of Nederland. 101 F.3d at 1095.
Id-
Scurlock,858F.2datl523.
City of Nederland . 101 F.3d at 1095. In addition
to affirming the district court's decision (Cite to lower
court), City of Nederland also validated another federal
preemption case arising in Texas, Texas Manufactured
Housing Association v. City of La Porte . 974 F.Supp.
602 (S.D. Tex. 1996). The city in that case focused on
the perception of mobility and transportability of a
HUD Code manufactured home and the perceived ef-
fect on property values as the basis for excluding HUD
Code manufactured homes. Id. at 606-07.
"'
Id- at 1104.
'° Ibid.
Colorado Manufactured Housing Assn. v. City of
Salida. 977 F.Supp. 1080 (D.Colo. 1997).
" Id. at 1087-88.
Additionally, by state statute, cities and counties in
North Carolina "may not adopt or enforce zoning
regulations or other provisions which have the effect of
excluding manufactured homes from the entire zoning
jurisdiction." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-383.1(c).
See , e.g. . Katherine Warner and Robert Johnson,
Manufactured Housing Impacts on Adjacent Property
Values (University of Michigan, January 1993); Guo-
qiang Shen and Richard A. Stephenson, The Impact of
Manufactured Housing on Adjacent Site-Built Resi-
dential Properties in North Carolina (East Carolina
University 1998). The East Carolina University study
examined the impact in Carteret County, Henderson
County, Pitt County and Wake County.
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